Bar Q and A #11

a.) If public safety requires it, the President can place Sulu and Basilan under martial law since there is an actual Under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can place any part of the Philippines under martial law in case of rebellion, when public safety requires it.

b.) The following are the constitutional safeguards on the exercise of the power of the President to proclaim martial law:

i.There must be actual invasion or rebellion;

ii. The duration of the proclamation shall not exceed sixty days;

iii. Within forty-eight hours, the President shall report his action to If Congress is not in session, it must convene within twenty-four hours;

iv. Congress may by majority vote of all its members voting Jointly revoke the proclamation, and the President cannot set aside the revocation;

v. By the same vote and in the same manner, upon Initiative of the President, Congress may extend the proclamation If the invasion or rebellion continues and public safety requires the extension;

vi. The Supreme Court may review the factual sufficiency of the proclamation, and the Supreme Court must decide the case within thirty days from the time it was filed;

vii. Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the operation of the

viii. It does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts and of Military courts have no  Jurisdiction over civilians where civil courts are able to function. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., pp. 213- 214)

The calling-out power of the President refers to the power of the President to order the armed forces, whenever it becomes necessary, to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (David v. Macapagal- Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)

The petition should not be given due course. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are PURELY EXECUTIVE ACTS which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carried with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. Where the President opts to revoke the conditional pardon given, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefore by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, is a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny. (Torres v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987)

The power of the President to declare a state of rebellion is based on the power of the President as chief executive and commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to suppress it. It is not necessary for the President to declare a state of rebellion before calling out the Armed forces of the Philippines to suppress it. The proclamation only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called upon to suppress it. (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656 [2004]) On the other hand, a proclamation of a state of national emergency, the President is already calling out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to suppress not only rebellion but also lawless violence. (David v. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 162[2006])

NO, the provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces and the police. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code since said provision only refers to calamities and disasters only and not of looting as in the instant case (Kulayan vs Tan, July 3, 2012)

a.) NO, component 1 of the CNSS is not constitutional. Inside the 1987 Constitution is a well-entrenched constitutional precept that One President means that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of State. One of the acts is one inherent in the Commander-in-Chief powers of the president which is the calling out powers. This power is vested upon the President alone as an act of lesser gravity with the act of declaring martial law. As cited in Villena, there are constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which cannot be used by any other person either through ratification or approval because it must be exercised by him in person. (Kulayan v. Gov. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012)

b.) YES component 2 of the CNSS is constitutional. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. In Lagman v Medialdea the court ruled that even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law. Therefore, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

The pardoning power, as embodied in Sec. 19 of Art VII, is as follows: “Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.”

The exercise of the pardoning power is not absolute. The following are the limitations on the pardoning power of the President:

  1. it can be granted only after conviction by Final judgment, except in cases of amnesty;

  2. it cannot  be  granted  in  cases  of  civil  or legislative contempt;

  3. it cannot absolve convict of civil liability;

  4. it cannot      be     granted      in     cases     of impeachment;

  5. it  cannot   be   granted   for   violations   of election laws   without favorable recommendations of the COMELEC; and

  6. it cannot restore public offices forfeited.

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress (Article VII, Sec. 19 of the 1987 Constitution)

No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission. (Article IX-C, Sec. S of the 1987 Constitution)

The only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in:

  1. Impeachment cases;

  2. Cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and

  3. Cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the

Any act of Congress by way of statute can not operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President. (Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)

The argument of A is not valid. As held in Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272, a judicial pronouncement that a convict who was granted a pardon subject to the condition that he should not again violate any penal law is not necessary before he can be declared to have violated the condition of his pardon. Moreover, a hearing is not necessary before A can be recommitted to prison. By accepting the conditional pardon, A, agreed that the determination by the President that he violated the condition of his pardon shall be conclusive upon him and an order for his arrest should at once be issued.

The argument of the Vice Governor should be rejected. As held in Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844, the power of executive clemency extends to administrative cases.  In granting the power of executive clemency upon the President, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution does not distinguish between criminal and administrative cases. Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution excludes impeachment cases,  which are not criminal cases, from the scope of the power of executive clemency.   If this power may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would have been unnecessary to exclude impeachment cases from this scope. If the President can grant pardons in criminal cases,  with more reason he can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are less serious.

  1. The following are the limitations on the pardoning power of the President:

  • a.It cannot be granted in cases of impeachment;

  • b.Reprieves, commutations, pardon, and remission of fines and forfeitures can be granted only after conviction by final

  • c. Amnesty requires the concurrence of the majority of all members of Congress

  • d. The favorable recommendation of the COMELEC is required for violation of election laws, rules and regulations.

  • e.The President cannot pardon members and employees of the Judiciary found guilty by the Supreme Court in administrative cases

  1. According to Barrioquinto Fernandez (82 Phil. 642), the following are the distinctions between pardon and amnesty:

  • a. Pardon is a private act and must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned; while amnesty is a public act of which courts take judicial notice;

  • b. Pardon does not require the concurrence of Congress, while amnesty requires the concurrence of Congress;

  • c. Pardon is granted to individuals, while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities;

  • d. Pardon may be granted for any offense, while amnesty is granted for political offenses;

  • e. Pardon is granted after final conviction, while amnesty may be granted at any time; and

  • f. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of his offense, while amnesty looks backward and the person granted it stands before the law as though he had committed no offense.

Pardon can be given only after final convictions; amnesty can be given at any time and even before the filing of a criminal case. Pardon looks forward; amnesty looks backward, as if the accused never committed & crime. Pardon is given to individuals. Amnesty is given to a class of persons. Pardon is given for all criminal offenses. Amnesty is given for political offenses. Pardon does not require the concurrence of Congress. Amnesty requires the concurrence of Congress. Pardon must be proven, because it is a private act; amnesty need not be proven, because it is a public act. (Barriequinto K Ferrandez, G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949, 82 Phils. 642)