Political Law Bar Q and A

Political Law Bar Questions and Answers

Bar Q and A #29

1.) Butchoy installed a jumper cable. He was prosecuted under a Makati ordinance penalizing such act. He moved for its dismissal on the ground that the jumper cable was within the territorial jurisdiction of Mandaluyong and not Makati. The case was dismissed. The City of Mandaluyong thereafter filed a case against him for theft under the Revised Penal Code (RCP). Is there double jeopardy? a. No. The first jeopardy was terminated with his express consent; b. Yes. This is double jeopardy of the second kind – prosecution for the same act under an ordinance and a law; c. Yes. He is prosecuted for the same offense which has already been dismissed by the City of Makati; d. No. The second kind of double jeopardy under Section 21, Article III only contemplates conviction or acquittal which could terminate a first jeopardy.

D. No. The second kind of double jeopardy under Section 21, Article III only contemplates conviction or acquittal which could terminate a first jeopardy. (Zapatos Vs People, 411 SCRA 148)

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2.) Amoroso was• charged with treason before a military court martial. He was acquitted. He was later charged with the same offense before a Regional Trial Court. He asks that the information be quashed on the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution objects, contending that for purposes of double jeopardy, the military court martial cannot be considered as a "competent court." Should the Regional Trial Court grant Amoroso's motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy?

YES, the Motion to Dismiss should be granted. A defendant, having been acquitted of a crime by a court-martial of competent jurisdiction proceeding under lawful authority, cannot be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court.

It appearing that the offense charged in the Court Martial and in the Regional Trial Court is the same, that the military court had jurisdiction to try the case and that both courts derive their powers from one sovereignty, the acquittal by the military court should be a bar to Amoroso’s further prosecution for the same offense in the Regional Trial Court (Crisologo v. People, (G.R. No. L-6277, February 26, 1954); Marcos v. Chief of Staff (G.R. No. L-4663, May 30, 1951); Garcia v. Executive Secretary (G.R. 198554, July 30, 2012).

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3.) An Information for Estafa was filed against the accused, Mr. D. During the course of the trial, Mr. D filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute the case for a reasonable length of time. Opposing the motion, the prosecution argued that its failure to present its witnesses was due to circumstances beyond its control. Eventually, the trial court dismissed the case with finality on the ground that Mr. D’s right to speedy trial was violated. A month after, the same criminal case for Estafa was refilled against Mr. D, prompting him to file a motion to dismiss invoking his right against double jeopardy. The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing that the first criminal case for Estafa was dismissed with the express consent of the accused as it was, in fact, upon his own motion. Moreover, it was already able to secure the commitments of its witnesses to appear; hence, it would be prejudicial for the State if the case were to be dismissed without trial. (a) For double jeopardy to attach, what requisites must exist? (b) Rule on Mr. D’s present motion.

a.) No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act (Section 21, Article III, CONST.). To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

b.) Mr. D’s motion to dismiss should be granted. A dismissal predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial upon his own motion or express consent, amounts to an acquittal which will bar another prosecution of the accused for the same offense This is an exception to the rule that a dismissal upon the motion or with the express consent of the accused will not be a bar to the subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense. (Salcedo v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-49375, February 28, 1979)

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4.) From mainland China where he was born of Chinese parents, Mr. Nya Tsa Chan migrated to the Philippines in 1894. As of April 11, 1899, he was already a permanent resident of the Philippine Islands and continued to reside in this country until his death. During his lifetime and when he was already in the Philippines, Mr. Nya Tsa Chan married Charing, a Filipina, with whom he begot one son, Hap Chan, who was born on October 18. 1897. Hap Chan got married also to Nimfa, a Filipina, and one of their children was Lacqui Chan who was born on September 27. 1936. Lacqui Chan finished the course Bachelor of Science in Commerce and eventually engaged in business. In the May 1989 election, Lacqui Chan ran for and was elected Representative (Congressman). His rival candidate, Ramon Deloria, filed a quo warranto or disqualification case against him on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen. It was pointed out in particular, that Lacqui Chan did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of 21. Decide whether Mr. Lacqui Chan suffers from a disqualification or not.

Lacqui Chan is a Filipino citizen and need not elect Philippine citizenship. His father, Hap Chan, was a Spanish subject, was residing in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and continued to reside in the Philippines. In accordance with Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, he was a Filipino citizen. Hence, in accordance with Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution. Lacqui Chan is a natural-born Filipino citizen, since his father was a Filipino citizen.

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5.) Miguel Sin was born a year ago in China to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. His parents met in Shanghai where they were lawfully married just two years ago. Is Miguel Sin a Filipino citizen?

YES, Miguel Sin is a Filipino citizen because he is the legitimate child of a Filipino mother. Under Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, his mother retained her Philippine citizenship despite her marriage to an alien husband, and according to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1987 Constitution, children born of a Filipino mother are Filipino citizens.

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6.) Atty. Emily Go, a legitimate daughter of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, was born in 1945. At 21, she elected Philippine citizenship and studied law. She passed the bar examinations and engaged in private practice for many years. The Judicial and Bar Council nominated her as a candidate for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. But her nomination is being contested by Atty. Juris Castillo, also an aspirant to the position. She claims that Atty. Emily Go is not a natural- born citizen, hence, not qualified to be appointed to the Supreme Court. Is this contention correct?

The contention that Atty. Emily Go is not a natural-born citizen is not correct. She was born before January 17, 1973 of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. She elected Philippine citizenship when she reached twenty-one years of age. Those who elect Philippine citizenship under Section 1(3), Article IV of the Constitution are natural-born citizens.

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7.) Atty. Richard Chua was born in 1964. He is a legitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. His father became a naturalized Filipino citizen when Atty. Chua was still a minor. Eventually, he studied law and was allowed by the Supreme Court to take the bar examinations, subject to his submission to the Supreme Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. Although he never complied with such requirement, Atty. Chua practiced law for many years until one Noel Eugenio filed with the Supreme Court a complaint for disbarment against him on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen. He then filed with the Bureau of Immigration an affidavit electing Philippine citizenship. Noel contested it claiming it was filed many years after Atty. Chua reached the age of majority. Will Atty. Chua be disbarred? Explain.

Atty. William Chua should not be disbarred. In accordance with Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act, he became a naturalized Philippine citizen when his father became a Filipino citizen during his minority. Hence, there was no need for him to elect Philippine citizenship (Co v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692, [1991]).

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8.) Edwin Nicasio, born in the Philippines of Filipino parents and raised in the province of Nueva Ecija, ran for Governor of his home province. He won and he was sworn into office.It was recently revealed, however, that Nicasio is a naturalized American citizen. a. Does he still possess Philippine citizenship? b. If Nicasio was born in the United States, would he still be a citizen of the Philippines?

a. NO. Nicasio no longer possesses Philippine citizenship. As held in Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245, by becoming a naturalized American citizen, Nicasio lost his Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1(1) of Commonwealth Act No. 63, Philippine citizenship is lost by naturalization in a foreign country.

b. If Nicasio was born in the United States, he would still be a citizen of the Philippines, since his parents are Filipinos. Under Section 1(2), those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines are citizens of the Philippines. Nicasio would possess dual citizenship, since under American Law persons born in the United States are American citizens. As held in Aznar vs. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703, a person who possesses both Philippine and American citizenship is still a Filipino and does not lose his Philippine citizenship unless he renounces it.

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9.) Discuss the evolution of the principle of jus sanguinis as basis of Filipino citizenship under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.

Section 1. Art. III of the 1935 Constitution adopted the jus sanguinis principles as the basis of the Filipino citizenship if the father is a Filipino citizen. However, Subsection 4, Section 1, Art. III of the Constitution provided that if the mother was a Filipino citizen who lost her Philippine citizenship because of her marriage to a foreign husband, her children could elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

Subsection 2, Section 1, Art. III of the 1973 Constitution provided that a child born of a father or a mother who is a citizen of the Philippines is a Filipino citizen.

Section 2, Art. III of the 1973 Constitution provided that a child whose father or mother is a Filipino citizen is a Filipino citizen. Subsection 3, Section 1, Art. IV of the 1987 Constitution provided that a child born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1973 Constitution is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Tecson v COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277 [2004]).

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10.) Candidate X, a naturalized Filipino citizen, ran for Congressman for the Lone District of Batanes. After a close electoral contest, he won by a slim margin of 500 votes. His sole opponent, Y, filed an election protest before the Commission on Election (COMELEC), claiming that X should be disqualified to run for said position because he is not a natural- born citizen. While the case was pending, X was proclaimed by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Batanes as the duly elected Congressman of the province. (2019 BAR) a. Distinguish between natural-born and naturalized citizen under the 1987 Constitution, b. Is X qualified to run for Congress? Explain. c. Did X’s proclamation divest the COMELEC of its jurisdiction to decide the case and vest the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction to hear the case? Explain.

a.)

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. [Art. IV, Sec. 2, 1987 Const.]

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who acquire Philippine Citizenship through either:

1.) Judicial naturalization under CA 473 or 2) Administrative Naturalization Law (R.A. 9139). A third option is Derivative Naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands found under section 15 of CA 473 which provides that: “Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”

b.) NO, X is not qualified to run for Congress. The Constitution prescribes that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines [Art. VI, Sec. 6, 1987 Const]. In this case, X is a naturalized citizen and is thus not qualified to run for Congress.

c.) NO, COMELEC maintains its jurisdiction over the matter. To divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction over election cases of Members of the House of Representatives, the following requisites must concur:

1. Valid Proclamation;
2. Valid oath; and
3. Assumption of office on June 30.

Thus, the mere proclamation of X does not yet transfer jurisdiction from the COMELEC to the HRET. [Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013]

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