YES, the Motion to Dismiss should be granted. A defendant, having been acquitted of a crime by a court-martial of competent jurisdiction proceeding under lawful authority, cannot be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court.
It appearing that the offense charged in the Court Martial and in the Regional Trial Court is the same, that the military court had jurisdiction to try the case and that both courts derive their powers from one sovereignty, the acquittal by the military court should be a bar to Amoroso’s further prosecution for the same offense in the Regional Trial Court (Crisologo v. People, (G.R. No. L-6277, February 26, 1954); Marcos v. Chief of Staff (G.R. No. L-4663, May 30, 1951); Garcia v. Executive Secretary (G.R. 198554, July 30, 2012).
a.) No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act (Section 21, Article III, CONST.). To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
b.) Mr. D’s motion to dismiss should be granted. A dismissal predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial upon his own motion or express consent, amounts to an acquittal which will bar another prosecution of the accused for the same offense This is an exception to the rule that a dismissal upon the motion or with the express consent of the accused will not be a bar to the subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense. (Salcedo v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-49375, February 28, 1979)
Lacqui Chan is a Filipino citizen and need not elect Philippine citizenship. His father, Hap Chan, was a Spanish subject, was residing in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and continued to reside in the Philippines. In accordance with Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, he was a Filipino citizen. Hence, in accordance with Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution. Lacqui Chan is a natural-born Filipino citizen, since his father was a Filipino citizen.
YES, Miguel Sin is a Filipino citizen because he is the legitimate child of a Filipino mother. Under Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, his mother retained her Philippine citizenship despite her marriage to an alien husband, and according to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1987 Constitution, children born of a Filipino mother are Filipino citizens.
The contention that Atty. Emily Go is not a natural-born citizen is not correct. She was born before January 17, 1973 of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. She elected Philippine citizenship when she reached twenty-one years of age. Those who elect Philippine citizenship under Section 1(3), Article IV of the Constitution are natural-born citizens.
Atty. William Chua should not be disbarred. In accordance with Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act, he became a naturalized Philippine citizen when his father became a Filipino citizen during his minority. Hence, there was no need for him to elect Philippine citizenship (Co v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692, ).
a. NO. Nicasio no longer possesses Philippine citizenship. As held in Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245, by becoming a naturalized American citizen, Nicasio lost his Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1(1) of Commonwealth Act No. 63, Philippine citizenship is lost by naturalization in a foreign country.
b. If Nicasio was born in the United States, he would still be a citizen of the Philippines, since his parents are Filipinos. Under Section 1(2), those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines are citizens of the Philippines. Nicasio would possess dual citizenship, since under American Law persons born in the United States are American citizens. As held in Aznar vs. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703, a person who possesses both Philippine and American citizenship is still a Filipino and does not lose his Philippine citizenship unless he renounces it.
Section 1. Art. III of the 1935 Constitution adopted the jus sanguinis principles as the basis of the Filipino citizenship if the father is a Filipino citizen. However, Subsection 4, Section 1, Art. III of the Constitution provided that if the mother was a Filipino citizen who lost her Philippine citizenship because of her marriage to a foreign husband, her children could elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Subsection 2, Section 1, Art. III of the 1973 Constitution provided that a child born of a father or a mother who is a citizen of the Philippines is a Filipino citizen.
Section 2, Art. III of the 1973 Constitution provided that a child whose father or mother is a Filipino citizen is a Filipino citizen. Subsection 3, Section 1, Art. IV of the 1987 Constitution provided that a child born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1973 Constitution is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Tecson v COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277 ).
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. [Art. IV, Sec. 2, 1987 Const.]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who acquire Philippine Citizenship through either:
1.) Judicial naturalization under CA 473 or 2) Administrative Naturalization Law (R.A. 9139). A third option is Derivative Naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands found under section 15 of CA 473 which provides that: “Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
b.) NO, X is not qualified to run for Congress. The Constitution prescribes that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines [Art. VI, Sec. 6, 1987 Const]. In this case, X is a naturalized citizen and is thus not qualified to run for Congress.
c.) NO, COMELEC maintains its jurisdiction over the matter. To divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction over election cases of Members of the House of Representatives, the following requisites must concur:
1. Valid Proclamation;
2. Valid oath; and
3. Assumption of office on June 30.
Thus, the mere proclamation of X does not yet transfer jurisdiction from the COMELEC to the HRET. [Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013]