Bar Q and A #31

a. Under Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution. Zeny retained her Filipino citizenship. Since she also became a citizen of Kongo, she possesses dual citizenship. Pursuant to Section 40
(d) of the Local Government Code, she is disqualified to run for governor. In addition, if Zeny returned to the Philippines, less than a year immediately before the day of the election, Zeny is not qualified to run for Governor of Sorsogon. Under Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code, a candidate for governor must be a resident in the province where he intends to run at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election. By residing in Kongo upon her marriage in 1989, Zeny abandoned her residence in the Philippines. This is in accordance with the decision in Caasi v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 229.

b.) Although under Section 11(1), Article XVI of the Constitution, mass media must be wholly owned by Filipino citizens and under Section 2 of the Anti-Dummy Law aliens may not intervene in the management of any nationalized business activity, Zeny may be elected vice president of the Philippine Bulletin, because she has remained a Filipino Under Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution, Filipino citizens who marry aliens retains their citizenship unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. Zeny is not guilty of any of acts or omission which will result in loss of citizenship are enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63. As held in Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, a person who possesses dual citizenship like Zeny may exercise rights of citizenship in both countries and the use of a passport pertaining to one country does not result in loss of citizenship in the other country.

Andres Ang should be considered a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He was born of a Filipino mother on January 20, 1973. This was after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973. Under Section (1), Article VI of the 1973 Constitution, those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines are citizens of the Philippines. Andres Ang remained a citizen of the Philippines after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution provides: "The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;"

Cruz was qualified to run as representative of the First District of Pampanga. Since his parents were Filipino citizens, he was a natural-born citizen. Although he became a naturalized American citizen, under the ruling in Bengson v. HRET, 357 SCRA 545, by virtue of his repatriation, Cruz was restored to his original status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The following are the constitutional provisions reflecting the State policy on transparency in matters of public interest:

1. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Section 28, Article II)

2. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded to citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (Section 7, Article III)

3. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member. (Section 20. Article VI)

4. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence," (Section 12, Article XI)

5. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office, and as often as thereafter may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. (Section 17, Article XI)

6. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public." (Section 21 Article XII) As explained in Valmonte v. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256, the purpose of the policy is to protect the people from abuse of governmental power. If access to information of public concern is denied, the postulate "public office is a public trust" would be mere empty words.

a. The law requiring all candidates for national or local elective offices to be college degree holders should be considered as unconstitutional with respect to national elective offices, because it is not one of the qualifications specifically required for these offices. The qualifications for these positions under the Constitution are exclusive in character and the Congress would be incompetent to prescribe this requirement as an additional qualification for candidates for national elective office. This additional requirement would, however, be valid with respect to candidates for local elective posts (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA 410).

b. Such designation is unconstitutional because the Constitution provides that no person shall be appointed or designated in any of the constitutional commissions in a temporary or acting capacity (Articles IX-B, Section 1(2), IX- C, Section 2 and IX-D, Section 2).

c. The appointment can be upheld, because only the Ombudsman is required under the Constitution to have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years prior to his appointment. (Article XI, Section 8).

a. A is senior to B. In accordance with the ruling in Summers vs. Ozaeta, 81 Phil. 754, the ad interim appointment extended to A is permanent and is effective upon his acceptance although it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

b. If Congress adjourned without the appointments of A and B having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, A cannot return to his old position. As held in Summers vs. Ozaeta, 81 Phil. 754, by accepting an ad interim appointment to a new position, A waived his right to hold his old position. On the other hand, since B did not assume the new position, he retained his old position.

According to Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 637 [1992], an acting appointment is merely temporary. As held in Marohombsar v. Alonto. 194 SCRA 390 [1991], a temporary appointment cannot become a permanent appointment, unless a new appointment which is permanent is made. This holds true unless the acting appointment was made because of a temporary vacancy. In such a case, the temporary appointee holds office until the assumption of office by the permanent appointee.

a.) NO, B’s contention is not An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.

The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. (Matibag v Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002)

b.) YES, the President can continue to reappoint Under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be considered again if the President renews the appointment. The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years. An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term.