(a) He is not prohibited. In computing the three- term limit, only the term for which the local official was elected should be considered. The second sentence of Section 8, Article X, of the Constitution states that the voluntary renunciation shall not be considered as interruption of the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected (Borja v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998)
(b) A mayor who served three consecutive terms and did not seek a fourth term but ran and won in the recall election can serve, because the recall election was not an immediate reelection (Socrates v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683, 155083-84)
(c) If a municipality in which a mayor served three consecutive terms was converted to a city, he cannot run as city mayor in the first election. For purposes of applying the three-term limit, the office of the municipal mayor should not be considered as different from that of the city mayor (Latasa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003)
(d) The temporary inability of an elective official to exercise his functions due to preventive suspension is not an interruption of his term, because it did not involve loss of title to the office (Aldovino Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009.
(e) If a candidate was proclaimed for three consecutive terms but did not serve in full because of loss in an election protest he is not disqualified (Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999).
In exempting provinces composed of one or more islands from both the contiguity and land area requirements, Article 9 of the IRR cannot be considered inconsistent with the criteria under Section 461 of the Local Government Code. Far from being absolute regarding application of the requirement of a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers ascertified by the Land Management Bureau, Section 461 allows for said exemption by providing, under paragraph (b) thereof, that the territory need not be contiguous if (the new province) comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
For as long as there is compliance with the income requirement, the legislative intent is, after all, to the effect that the land area and population requirements may be overridden by the established economic viability of the proposed province.
Governor Yuri is correct. All the registered voters of the Province of Laguna should be included in the plebiscite. The conversion of the City of Malumanay into a highly urbanized city will adversely affect the Province of Laguna and its residents. The territory of the Province of Laguna will be reduced. Its share in the internal revenue allotment will be reduced, because the population and land area are included as basis for determining its share. Once the City of Malumanay becomes a highly urbanized city, the Province of Laguna will no longer share in the taxes collected by the City of Malumanay. The City of Malumanay will be under the supervision of the President instead of the Province of Laguna. Decisions of the City of Malumanay in administrative cases involving barangay officials will no longer be appealable to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The registered voters of the City of Malumanay will no longer be entitled to vote for provincial officials. To limit the plebiscite to the voters of City of Malumanay would nullify the principle of majority rule (Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014).
a. NO, the Barangay Assembly cannot exercise any police power. Under Section 398 ofthe Local Government Code, it can only recommend to the Sangguniang Barangay the adoption of measures for the welfare of the barangay and decide on the adoption of an initiative.
b. The Liga ng Mga Barangay cannot exercise legislative powers. As stated in Bito-Onon v. Fernandez. 350 SCRA 732 , it is not a local government unit and its primary purpose is to determine representation of the liga in the sanggunians; to ventilate, articulate, and crystallize issues affecting barangay government administration; and to secure solutions for them through proper and legal means.
The suit of AM will not prosper. The removal of the billboards is not an exercise of the power of eminent domain but of police power (Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580 11915D). The abatement of a nuisance in the exercise of police power does not constitute taking of property and does not entitle the owner of the property involved to compensation (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 ).
The ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. The right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the exercise of police power. The ordinance is not prohibiting the disco pub owners and the hospitality girls from pursuing their calling or business but is merely regulating it (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA 410 ) The ordinance is a valid exercise of police power, because its purpose is to safeguard public health (Beltran vs. Secretary of Health, 476 SCRA 168 ).
The city government has no power to stop tile operations of the plant. Since its operations is not a nuisance per se, the city government cannot abate it extra judicially. A suit must be filed in court (ACEnterprises, Inc. v. Frabelle Properties Corporation, 506 SCRA 625 ).
(a) The Municipality of Santa has the power to expropriate. Section 19 of the Local Government Code grants all local government units the power of eminent domain. However, Section 19 of the Local Government Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain [Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137 (2000)].
(b) The disapproval of Resolution No. 1 by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur on the ground that there may be other lots available in Santa is not a valid ground, because it can disapprove Resolution No. 1 solely on the ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa [Modayv. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586 (1997)].
(c) If there are other lots that are better and more appropriate for the municipal sports center, the lot owned by Christina should not be expropriated. Its choice is arbitrary [Municipality of Meycauayan v. IAC, 157 SCRA 640 (1988)].
The disapproval of the ordinance is not correct. Under Section 56(c) (Local Government Code), the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Leyte can declare the ordinance invalid only if it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bulalakaw. In the instant case, the ordinance is well within the power of the Sangguniang Bayan. The disapproval of the ordinance by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Leyte was outside its authority having been done on a matter pertaining to the wisdom of the ordinance which pertains to the Sangguniang Bayan [Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586 )
The petition should be granted. In accordance with Macasiano v. Diokno. 212 SCRA 464 (1992), since public streets are properties for public use and are outside the commerce of man, the City Mayor and the City Engineer cannot lease or license portions of the city streets to market stallholders.