Political Law Bar Q and A

Political Law Bar Questions and Answers

Bar Q and A #7

1.) AVE ran for Congressman of QU province. However, his opponent, BART, was the one proclaimed and seated as the winner of the election by the COMELEC. AVE filed seasonably a protest before HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal). After two years, HRET reversed the COMELEC's decision and AVE was proclaimed finally as the duly elected Congressman. Thus, he had only one year to serve in Congress. Can AVE collect salaries and allowances from the government for the first two years of his term as Congressman? Should BART refund to the government the salaries and allowances he had received as Congressman? What will happen to the bills that BART alone authored and were approved by the House of Representatives while he was seated as Congressman? Reason and explain briefly.

AVE cannot collect salaries and allowances from the government for the first two years of his term, because in the meanwhile BART collected the salaries and allowances. BART was a de facto officer while he was in possession of the office. To allow AVE to collect the salaries and allowances will result in making the government pay a second time (Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Public Officers, [1890] pp. 222-223). BART is not required to refund to the government the salaries and allowances he received. As a de facto officer, he is entitled to the salaries and allowances because he rendered services during his incumbency (Rodriguez v. Tan, 91 Phil. 724). The bills which BART alone authored and were approved by the House of Representatives are valid because he was a de facto officer during his incumbency. The acts of a de facto officer are valid insofar as the public is concerned. (People v. Garcia, 313 SCRA 279)

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2.) Suppose there, are 202 members in the House of Representatives. Of this number, 185 belong to the Progressive Party of the Philippines or PPP, while 17 belong to the Citizens Party or CP. How would you answer the following questions regarding the representation of the House in the Commission on Appointments? A. How many seats would the PPP be entitled to have in the Commission on Appointments? Explain your answer fully. B. Suppose 15 of the CP representatives, while maintaining their party affiliation, entered into a political alliance with the PPP in order to form the “Rainbow Coalition” in the House. What effect, if any, would this have on the right of the CP to have a seat or seats in the Commission on Appointments? Explain your answer fully.

A.) The 185 members of the Progressive Party of the Philippines represent 58 percent of the 202 members of the House of Representatives, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution, it is entitled to have ten of the twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments. Although the 185 members of Progressive Party of the Philippines represent 10.98 seats in the Commission on Appointments, under the ruling in Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 (1992), a fractional membership cannot be rounded off to full membership because it will result in overrepresentation of that political party and under-representation of the other political parties.

B.) The political alliance formed by the 15 members of the Citizens Party with the Progressive Party of the Philippines will not result in the diminution of the number of seats in the Commission on Appointments to which the Citizens Party is As held in Cunanan v. Tan, 5SCRA 1 (1962), a temporary alliance between the members of one political party and another political party does not authorize a change in the membership of the Commission on Appointments. Otherwise, the Commission on Appointments will have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House of Representatives.

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3.) Y was elected Senator in the May 1987 national elections. He was born out of wedlock in 1949 of an American father and a naturalized Filipina mother. Y never elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Before what body should T, the losing candidate, question the election of Y? State the reasons for your answer.

T, the losing candidate, should question the election of Y before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, because the issue involved is the qualification of Y to be a Senator. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members."

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4.) What is the function of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal?

The function of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators and congressmen, respectively. (Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution)

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5.) What is the composition of each?

The Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are composed of nine members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six members are Senators and Congressmen, respectively, chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties as well as the parties registered under the party-list system represented in the House of Representatives, in the case of the latter. (Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution)

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6.) Beauty was proclaimed as the winning candidate for the position of Representative in the House of Representatives three (3) days after the elections in May. She then immediately took her oath of office. However, there was a pending disqualification case against her, which case was eventually decided by the COMELEC against her 10 days after the election. Since she has already been proclaimed, she ignored that decision and did not bother appealing it. The COMELEC then declared in the first week of June that its decision holding that Beauty was not validly elected had become final. Beauty then went to the Supreme Court questioning the jurisdiction of the COMELEC claiming that since she had already been proclaimed and had taken her oath of office, such election body had no more right to come up with a decision – that the jurisdiction had already been transferred to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. How defensible is the argument of Beauty?

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case of Beauty, since she has already been proclaimed. The proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal over election contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the winning candidate,. The proclamation divests the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction over the question of disqualifications pending before it at the time of the proclamation. Any case pertaining to questions over the qualifications of a winning candidate should be raised before the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal. (Limkaichong v. COMELEC, 583 SCRA 1; Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, 674 SCRA 530)

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7.) Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution establishes an Electoral Tribunal for each of the Houses of Congress, and makes each Electoral Tribunal "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members." On the other hand, Sec. 2(1), C (Commission on Elections), Art. IX of the Constitution grants to the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations "relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." Considering that there is no concurrence of jurisdiction between the Electoral Tribunals and the COMELEC, state when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals begins, and the COMELEC's jurisdiction ends. Explain your answer.

It is well-entrenched in a long line of cases decided by the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal begins once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office. It is only after the occurrence of these events that a candidate can be considered as either a Member of the House of Representatives or a Senator.

The practical application of these rulings, at least insofar as the HRET is concerned, has been that it commences to exercise such jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the COMELEC, which has initial jurisdiction over said matters, upon the proclamation of the winning candidate. (Cruz, 2014)

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8.) Congressman Nonoy delivered a privilege speech charging the Intercontinental Universal Bank (IUB) with the sale of unregistered foreign securities, in violation of R.A. 8799. He then filed, and the House of Representatives unanimously approved, a Resolution directing the House Committee on Good Government (HCGG) to conduct an inquiry on the matter, in aid of legislation, in order to prevent the recurrence of any similar fraudulent activity. The HCGG immediately scheduled a hearing and invited the responsible officials of IUB, the Chairman and Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). On the date set for the hearing, only the SEC Commissioners appeared, prompting Congressman Nonoy to move for the issuance of the appropriate subpoena ad testificandum to compel the attendance of the invited resource persons. The IUB officials filed suit to prohibit HCGG from proceeding with the inquiry and to quash the subpoena, raising the following arguments: a. The subject of the legislative investigation is also the subject of criminal and civil actions pending before the courts and the prosecutor's office; thus, the legislative inquiry would preempt judicial action; b. Compelling the IUB officials, who are also respondents in the criminal and civil cases in court, to testify at the inquiry would violate their constitutional right against self- incrimination. Are the foregoing arguments tenable? Reasons. c. May the Governor of the BSP validly invoke executive privilege and, thus, refuse to attend the legislative inquiry? Why or why not?

a.) The argument is not tenable; since this is an essential component of legislative power, it cannot be made subordinate to criminal and civil actions. Otherwise, it would be very easy to subvert any investigation in aid of legislation through convenient ploy of instituting criminal and civil actions. (Standard Chartered Bank [Philippine Branch] v. Senate Committee in Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 541 SCRA 456)

b.) The argument is untenable. Since the IUB officials were not being subjected to a criminal penalty, they cannot invoke their right against self-incrimination unless a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded. (Standard Chartered Bank [Philippine Branch] v. Senate Committee in Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 541 SCRA 456)

c.) NO, because the power to invoke executive privilege is limited to the President (Senate v. Ermita 488 SCRA 1)

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9.) The House Committee on Appropriations conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation into alleged irregular and anomalous disbursements of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) and Congressional Initiative Allocation (CIA) of Congressmen as exposed by X, a Division Chief of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Implicated in the questionable disbursements are high officials of the Palace. The House Committee summoned X and the DBM Secretary to appear and testify. X refused to appear, while the Secretary appeared but refused to testify invoking executive privilege. May X be compelled to appear and testify? If yes, what sanction may be imposed on him? a. Is the Budget Secretary shielded by executive privilege from responding to the inquiries of the House Committee? Explain briefly. If the answer is no, is there any sanction that may be imposed upon him?

X may be compelled to appear and testify. Only the President or the Executive Secretary by the order of the President can invoke executive privilege (Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 13). He can be cited for contempt and ordered to be arrested (De la Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 579 SCRA 521).

a.) The Secretary of Budget and Management is not shielded by executive privilege from responding to the inquiries of the House Committee on Appropriations, because the inquiry is in aid of legislation and neither the President nor the Executive Secretary by the order of the President invoked executive privilege. (Senate v. Ermita, supra.) For refusing to testify, he may be cited for contempt and ordered to be arrested (De la Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, supra.)

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10.) Several senior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines received invitations from the Chairperson of the Senate Committees on National Defense and Security for them to appear as resource persons in scheduled public hearings regarding a wide range of subjects. The invitations state that these public hearings were triggered by the privilege speeches of the Senators that there was massive electoral fraud during the last national elections. The invitees Brigadier General Matapang and Lieutenant Coronel Makatuwiran, who were among those tasked to maintain peace and order during the last election, refused to attend because of an Executive Order banning all public officials enumerated in paragraph 3 thereof from appearing before either house of Congress without prior approval of the President to ensure adherence to the rule of executive privilege. Among those included in the enumeration are "senior officials of executive departments who, in the judgment of the department heads, are covered by executive privilege." Several individuals and groups challenge the constitutionality of the subject executive order because it frustrates the power of the Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Decide the case.

Under Section 5, Article XVI of the Constitution, the President is the Commander- in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. By virtue of this power, the President can prevent the Brigadier General Matapang and Liutenant Colonel Makatwiran from appearing before the Senate to testify before a legislative investigation. (Guidani v. Senga, 2006)

The provision in the Executive Order which authorized Department Secretaries to invoke executive privilege in case senior officials in their departments are asked to appear in a legislative investigation is unconstitutional. It is upon the President that executive power is vested. Only the President can make use of Executive Privilege. (Senate v. Ermita, 2006)

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