1.) The President appoints Emilio Melchor as Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission. Upon confirmation of Melchor's appointment, the President issues an executive order including him as Ex-Officio member of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), and the Board of Directors of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH). Allegedly, this is based on the Administrative Code of 1997 (E.O. No. 292), particularly Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V. This provision reads: "The chairman of the CSC shall be a member of the Board of Directors of other governing bodies of government entities whose functions affect the career development, employment, status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees... " A taxpayer questions the designation of Melchor as ex- officio member of the said corporations before the Supreme Court based on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) it violates the constitutional prohibition on members of the Constitutional Commissions to hold any other office or employment during his tenure; and (2) it impairs the independence of the CSC. Will the petition prosper? Explain
The petition will prosper. It is a clear violation of the special prohibition in Section 2 of Article IX-A of the Constitution, which strictly provides that he shall not hold any other office or employment during his tenure. The aforesaid provision does not make any distinction among the offices he may not hold, or as to whether or not the functions attached to said offices would be primarily related to his duties as Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission and therefore may be held in an ex officio capacity.
Additionally, the offices mentioned are vested by their charters with various powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. These powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF. Thus, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing board of the said offices, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman.
Corollarily, the designation as member of the governing Boards of the said offices entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. It is unconstitutional, for it goes against the principle behind an ex officio position.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, the designation of the CSC Chairman as member of the governing boards of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch. (Funa v. The Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
2.) Luzviminda Marfel, joined by eleven other retrenched employees, filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for unpaid retrenchment or separation pay, underpayment of wages and non-payment of emergency cost of living allowance. The complaint was filed against Food Terminal, Inc. Food Terminal Inc. moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, theorizing that it is a government-owned and controlled corporation and its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Marfel opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that although Food Terminal, Inc. is a corporation owned and controlled by the government earlier created and organized under the general corporation law as “The Greater Manila Food Terminal, Inc.”, it has still the marks of a private corporation: it directly hires its employees without seeking approval from the Civil Service Commission and its personnel are covered by the Social Security System and not the Government Service Insurance System. The question posed in the petition for certiorari at bar whether or not a labor law claim against a government- owned or controlled corporation like the Food Terminal, Inc. falls within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment or the Civil Service Commission? Decide and ratiocinate.
The claim of the retrenched employees falls under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission and not under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. As held in Lumanta v. National Labor Relations Commission, 170 SCRA 790, since Food Terminal, Inc., was organized under the Corporation Law and was not created by a special law in accordance with Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution, it is not covered by the civil service.
3.) A corporation, a holder of a certificate of registration issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, is owned and controlled by the Republic of the Philippines. The Civil Service Commission (CSC), in a memorandum-order, directs the corporation to comply with the Civil Service Rules in the appointment of all its officers and employees. The memorandum-order of the CSC is assailed by the corporation, as well as by its officers and employees, before the court. How should the case be resolved?
The memorandum order of the Civil Service Commission should be declared void. As held in Gamogamo v. PNOC Shipping and Transit Corporation, 381 SCRA 742, under Article IX-B, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution government-owned or controlled corporations organized under the Corporation Code are not covered by the Civil Service Law but by the Labor Code, because only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters are covered by the Civil Service.
4.) As counsel for the protestant, where will you file an election protest involving a contested elective position in: (a) the barangay? (b) the municipality? (c) the province? (d) the city? (e) the House of Representatives?
In accordance with Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution an election protest involving the elective position enumerated below should be filed in the following courts or tribunals:
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Barangay - Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, or Municipal Trial Court
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Municipality - Regional Trial Court
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Province – COMELEC
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City – COMELEC
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Under Section Article VI of the Constitution, an election protest involving the position of Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
5.) In an election protest involving the position of Governor of the Province of Laguna between "A", the protestee, and "B" the protestant, the First Division of the Commission on Elections rendered a decision upholding B's protest. Can "A" file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, from the decision of the COMELEC First Division? If yes, Why? If not what procedural step must he undertake first?
"A" cannot file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. As held in Mastura vs. Commission on Elections, 285 SCRA 493 (1998), the Supreme Court cannot review the decisions or resolutions of a division of the Commission on Elections. "A" should first file a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on Elections en banc.
6.) Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution establishes an Electoral Tribunal for each of the Houses of Congress, and makes each Electoral Tribunal "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members." On the other hand, Sec. 2(1), C (Commission on Elections), Art. IX of the Constitution grants to the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations "relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." Considering that there is no concurrence of jurisdiction between the Electoral Tribunals and the COMELEC, state when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals begins, and the COMELEC's jurisdiction ends. Explain your answer.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) A valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office (Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013). Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed and taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections over the election contest ends, and the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins. (Vinzons-Charo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007)
7.) Ang Araw, a multi-sectoral party-list organization duly registered as such with the Commission on Elections (Comelec), was proclaimed as one of the winning party-list groups in the last national elections. Its first nominee, Alejandro, assumed office as the party-list representative. About one year after Alejandro assumed office, the Interim Central Committee of Ang Araw expelled Alejandro from the party for disloyalty and replaced him with Andoy, its second nominee. Alejandro questioned before the Comelec his expulsion and replacement by Andoy. The Comelec considered Alejandro's petition as an intra-party dispute which it could resolve as an incident of its power to register political parties; it proceeded to uphold the expulsion. Is the Comelec's ruling correct?
Alejandro’s petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It is the HRET which has jurisdiction over the case, because Alejandro is already a Member of the House of Representatives. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015)
8.) Two petitions for the cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)/Denial of Due Course were filed with the Comelec against two candidates running as municipal mayors of different towns. The first petition was against Anselmo. Years ago, Anselmo was charged and convicted of the crime of rape by final judgment, and was sentenced to suffer the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. While Anselmo was in prison, the President commuted his sentence and he was discharged from prison. The second petition was against Ambrosio. Ambrosio's residency was questioned because he was allegedly a "green card holder," i.e., a permanent resident of the US, as evidenced by a certification to this effect from the US Embassy. Acting on the recommendations of its Law Department, the Comelec en banc motu proprio issued two resolutions granting the petitions against Anselmo and Ambrosio. Both Anselmo and Ambrosio filed separate petitions with the Supreme Court assailing the resolutions cancelling their respective CoCs. Both claimed that the Comelec en bane acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because the petitions should have first been heard and resolved by one of the Comelec's Divisions. Are Anselmo and Ambrosio correct?
Anselmo is incorrect. The rule is every quasi- judicial matter must first be tackled by a division subject to appeal by way of a Motion for Reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. In Jalosjos v. COMELEC (G.R. 205033, June 18, 2013), it was determined that a cancellation on the basis of perpetual disqualification is a matter that can be taken judicial notice of. When it cancels A CoC on that ground, it is acting in performance of an administrative function and, therefore, the rule in Article XI, Section 3 does not apply. Ambrosio, on the other hand, is correct that the petition for the cancellation of his CoC should have been first heard and resolved by the Comelec Division. Cancellation proceedings involve the COMELEC's quasijudicial functions. The Constitution mandates the COMELEC, in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, to hear and decide cases first by division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. (Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 154796-97, October 23, 2003)
9.) Candidate X, a naturalized Filipino citizen, ran for Congressman for the Lone District of Batanes. After a close electoral contest, he won by a slim margin of 500 votes. His sole opponent, Y, filed an election protest before the Commission on Election (COMELEC), claiming that X should be disqualified to run for said position because he is not a natural-born citizen. While the case was pending, X was proclaimed by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Batanes as the duly elected Congressman of the province. Did X’s proclamation divest the COMELEC of its jurisdiction to decide the case and vest the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction to hear the case? Explain.
NO, COMELEC maintains its jurisdiction over the matter. To divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction over election cases of Members of the House of Representatives, the following requisites must concur:
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Valid Proclamation;
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Valid oath; and
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Assumption of office on June 30.